Richard Feldman is an American professor of philosophy at the University of Rochester.
On the subject of the Gettier counterexamples to the traiditional justified-true-belief account of knowledge, Feldman briefly offers a defense of Gettier-style examples against the claim that they have false lemmas. The challenge is that Gettier examples all depend on the justified belief in some false proposition, and that a no-false-lemmas requirement (identified by several, including Gilbert Harman and D. M. Armstrong — Feldman quotes the latter) is enough to escape a Gettier example.
Feldman argues instead that one may easily modify a Gettier example, or construct similar ones, in which there are no false lemmas.
Name: Richard Feldman
Degrees: Ph.D. (University of Massachusetts, 1975)
BA (Cornell University, 1975)